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International legal research regarding international economic dispute
settlement tends to be a-theoretical. A theoretically-grounded analytic
framework is employed in this article which draws from scholarship from
political science, sociology, and economics regarding institutions and in-
ternational governmental organizations. The knowledge-legitimacy-
efficiency analytic framework is applied in this article to studies of General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT)/World Trade Organization (WTO)
dispute settlement in order to relate this relevant scholarship to the eco-
nomic field under primary study, Internet domain names. GA TT/WTO
knowledge regarding international trade law has thickened through multi-
lateral trade negotiations and dispute settlement decisions. The WTO's le-
gitimacy is increasingly questioned by disenchanted members, in particular
by those from developing countries, and by outside critics who believe the
organization to be undemocratic in process and unfair in outcome. How-
ever the WTO's efficiency with respect to quasi-judicial dispute settlement
. Michael P. Ryan, Visiting Associate Professor, McDonough School of Business,
Georgetown University; Ph.D., Political Science, University of Michigan; M. Phil., Ohio
State University. Prepared for presentation at the American Society of International
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procedure is perhaps a model for emulation by other multilateral institu-
tions. Likewise, World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO')
knowledge regarding trademark law is deep and relevant to Internet-
domain-name-dispute settlement. WIPO legitimacy has been earned
through the sponsorship ofpublic forums, fair, independent decisions, and
by virtue of its United Nations status. WIPO arbitration quickly established
itself as a more efficient alternative to national courts. Knowledge, legiti-
macy, and efficiency account for the rapid increase in the number of users
of WIPO Internet domain name arbitration.
1. INTRODUCTION
Karl Marx's analytic framework and his materialist perspective on his-
torical change predicts that change in the technology of production leads to
change in the organization of the economy which in turn leads to change in
social and political institutions.' At the turn of the twentieth century, the
growing network of railroad, steamship, telegraph, and telephone users
transformed business and economies in ways generally consistent with
Marx's predictions. These communication and transportation media en-
abled a managerial revolution in American business. The new communica-
tion infrastructure allowed mass production and distribution, encouraged
vertical integration and the corporate form, and entailed hierarchical organ-
izational practice and managerial professionalization. 2 The historical record
shows that American social and political institutions did change in response
to the technological and economic changes. Social forces pressed govern-
ment to change, though not in the way famously predicted by Marx, who
predicted the demise of capitalist economic organization and its associated
social and political institutions. Government instead grew to regulate the
new kinds of economic activity and the American liberal-regulatory state
was born.3 Government-as-regulator thereby became cause as well as effect
in the economy as the decisions of government influenced the further direc-
tion of competition and business practice.
What Marx did not understand sufficiently well was the social em-
beddedness of technological innovation, 4 i.e., how social and political insti-
tutions are facilitators of economic activity and themselves causal factors in
economic change. At the turn of the twenty-first century the growing net-
' ALLEN WOOD, KARL MARX 61-122 (1981).
2 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
3 MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 1890-
1916(1988).
4 RONALD J. DEIBERT, PARCHMENT, PRINTING, AND HYPERMEDIA: COMMUNICATION IN




work of Internet users is similarly transforming business and economy. The
Internet affords instant access to information, it provides interactive capa-
bility with information, and it enables communication among an ever-
growing network of users and each increase in the number of users in-
creases its value as a medium of communication and exchange. 5 The inven-
tion of the World Wide Web and of Internet browsers enable the creation of
an electronic marketplace for the order, purchase, and sometimes even de-
livery of goods and services.6 The arrival of the World Wide Web in 1990
was to the Internet like the arrival of the internal combustion engine to the
country lane.7 Business-to-consumer, business-to-business, business-to-
government, and government-to-consumer transactions are being carried
out faster and cheaper online than by telephone, fax, and mail. The new
communication medium is bringing new enterprise entrants with innovative
products and services into the marketplace and the invigorated competition
is encouraging established businesses to introduce new ways of making and
distributing products and services and to reform their ways of doing busi-
ness.8 Organizations are seeking to be more flexible in their capabilities,
quicker at making decisions, and more global in their perspectives by de-
bureaucratizing, by integrating less and forming alliances more, and by en-
couraging people at all levels in the organization to be learners and deci-
sion-makers.
9
The pace and trajectory of the Internet revolution within the economy,
however, depends upon not only technology adoption, business strategy,
and customer decision, but on the capacity of social and political institu-
tions to adapt to, support, and facilitate the new transactions. New social
and political institutions have been created to support Internet technology
and facilitate its economic potential. For example, Internet domain names
allowing Internet users to find their electronic destination with ease are the
names with the now familiar suffixes such as .corn, .org, and .edu.
The Domain Name System was established in response to the increas-
ing interest among universities and laboratories in the early 1980s in be-
coming Internet hosts. The number of hosts had grown too large and
complex for the routing system then in use, so the United States Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA"), which was guiding and
5 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 13 (1999).
6 THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (Derek Leebaert ed., 1999).
7 JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB 1 (2000).
8 GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION: THE FUSION OF COMPUTERS AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990s (Stephen P. Bradley et al. eds., 1993).
9 GLOBALIZING MANAGEMENT: CREATING AND LEADING THE COMPETITIVE ORGANIZATION
(Vladimir Pucik et al. eds., 1992).
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funding the creation of the Internet, encouraged several computer scientists
to take the lead in designing a new system. 0 They designed a hierarchical
system based on the model of the post office system and proposed their sys-
tem to the Internet community in two Requests for Comment ("RFCs") in
1983. Leaders at DARPA persuaded the Internet community, which pre-
ferred to make decisions by consensus among its users, to join together in
1985 for a summit meeting with many of the 2000-odd Internet hosts repre-
sented. They supported the proposed DNS, and one of its designers, a uni-
versity-based computer scientist, volunteered to become the administrator
of domain names.
When electronic mail and data transfer among academic and laboratory
researchers was the communication medium's dominant function, domain
names were of little commercial significance. A domain name is like a
postal address or a telephone number; yet it is also much more, for it identi-
fies the business enterprise, governmental or nongovernmental organiza-
tion, or academic institution which operates the Internet site. Domain
names facilitate Internet-based, digital electronic commerce by allowing us-
ers to locate the electronic source of information, goods, or services. For
this reason, domain names have increasingly come to possess commercial
value. As the value of domain names has risen, so have the disputes be-
tween and among those who would like to register and use particular
names. The unique address role of an Internet domain name, that there can
be only one, say, delta.com or apple.com, intensifies the commercial stakes
regarding the identification role of the Internet domain name. Disputes arise
among enterprises and organizations which want the same domain name,
challenging national courts to settle conflicts and fomenting demands for al-
ternative dispute settlement procedures. The WIPO, the Geneva-based
United Nations agency, stepped into domain name dispute settlement, offer-
ing an alternative to national (especially U.S. federal court) dispute settle-
ment procedures and remedies. What it does, why it came to do it, and how
it does so is investigated in this article.
International legal research regarding international economic dispute
settlement tends to be a-theoretical, tending to ignore concepts developed
in political science, economics, and sociology for the study of institutions in
general and of international governmental organizations ("IGOs") in par-
ticular. A theoretically-grounded analytic framework is employed in this
article, drawing from scholarship regarding institutions and IGOs, and from
political science, sociology, and economics.
The three central characteristics of IGO-based dispute settlement are
knowledge, legitimacy, and efficiency. Knowledge refers to the law, ideas,




causal theories and empirical experience associated with the IGO. Knowl-
edge guides what IGOs do with respect to economic dispute settlement. In
contrast, legitimacy refers to the fairness, integrity, independence, and re-
sponsiveness associated with the behavior of an IGO. Legitimacy guides
why IGOs conduct economic dispute settlement. Finally, efficiency refers
to the costs of transactions associated with the IGO. Efficiency guides how
IGOs conduct economic dispute settlement. Though an occasional piece of
legal scholarship appears devoted to issues of economic dispute settlement
regarding, say, foreign direct investmentI' or the loss of economic assets
during wartime,12 most of the scholarly research and analysis--and there is a
substantial body of it--concerns dispute settlement under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and its reformed World Trade
Organization ("WTO") institutional design, procedures, and outcomes.
The knowledge-legitimacy-efficiency analytic framework is applied
here to studies of GATT/WTO dispute settlement in order to relate relevant
scholarship to the economic field under primary study, Internet domain
names. GATT/WTO knowledge is based in a traditional consensus about
the utility of trade as a matter of economics and the need for a cooperation-
facilitating IGO as a matter of governance. Moreover, its body of laws has
continued to thicken through multilateral agreements and dispute settlement
decisions. The WTO's legitimacy is increasingly questioned by disen-
chanted members, particularly from developing countries, and by external
critics who believe the organization to be undemocratic as a matter of gov-
ernance and unfair as a matter of economics. The WTO's efficiency with
respect to quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedure is, nevertheless, per-
haps a model for emulation by other multilateral institutions.
WIPO knowledge regarding trademark law is, like that of the WTO,
deep and particularly relevant to Internet domain name dispute settlement.
WIPO legitimacy is a result of its status as a U.N. agency, its establishment
of open public forums regarding domain name governance, and its record of
delivering fair, independent dispute settlement decisions. WIPO arbitration
quickly established itself as a more efficient alternative to national courts.
Knowledge, legitimacy, and efficiency account for the rapid increase in the
number of users of WIPO Internet-domain-name arbitration. This article's
analytic framework and study of the role of international governmental or-
ganizations as governance facilitators in the world economy grounds better
than previous analyses of Internet-domain-name governance.'
3
11 Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Introduction to Dispute Settlement in International Trade
and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 613 (1995).12 Norbert Wuhler, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New Contribution
to the Process of International Claims Resolution, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 249 (1999).
13 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 617 (1999); Laurence R. Heifer and Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-
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II. KNOWLEDGE, LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY AND IGOs
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political,
economic, and social interaction. Throughout history, institutions have
been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in ex-
change. Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that
structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards
growth, stagnation, or decline. 14 Institutions-social organizations and
norms, governments and laws-crucially make markets function well or
poorly.15 Of singular importance to economic change, growth, and stagna-
tion are property institutions. 16 Markets demand credible, enforceable
commitments to function properly. Accordingly, property rights and the
contract are institutional constructions to reduce the transaction costs of
commercial activity; the establishment of such a set of property rights will
then allow individuals in highly complex interdependent situations to have
confidence in their dealings with individuals of whom they have no per-
sonal knowledge and with whom they have no reciprocal or ongoing ex-
change relationships.' 7 Property rights facilitate economic growth because
they describe the individual and group incentives in the system.' 8 Property
rights raise the private rate of return and thereby increase the effective re-
source base within an economy.' 9 As important as the constitutional struc-
ture of property rights for economic growth is the credible commitment of
government to enforce property rights. The essence of property rights is the
right to exclude, and an organization which has a comparative advantage in
violence is in the position to specify and enforce property rights. 20 En-
forcement depends upon the ability of an actor or a group of actors to meas-
ure the value of an asset's attributes, claim certain attributes for their own
use, and prevent others from capturing those same attributes.2' Property
right enforcement entails the existence of consensus regarding the definition
of property rights, procedures for dispute settlement, and the legitimacy of
state enforcement authority.
Political scientists explain that, although only states can grant property
National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).
14 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991).
5 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990).
16 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981).
17 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Performance: An Historical Introduc-
tion, 17 WORLD DEV. 1319, 1320 (1989).
18 North, supra note 16, at 7.
1d. at 67.
z0ld. at 21.




rights, international institutions exist to reduce the costs of international
transactions and frictions of international relations. International institu-
tions make it cheaper for governments to come together to negotiate agree-
ments, reduce transaction costs of legitimate bargains and increase them for
illegitimate ones, and organize issue-areas so that productive linkages
(those that facilitate agreements consistent with the principles of the re-
gime) are facilitated, while destructive linkages and bargains that are incon-
sistent with regime principles are discouraged. Furthermore, international
institutions reduce the occurrence of information asymmetries, where some
22actors may know more about a situation than others. An international in-
stitution, or regime, is a governing arrangement for transnational and inter-
23.
state relations, i.e., a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations con-
verge in a given area of international relations.2 4 Principles are beliefs of
fact, causation, and rectitude; norms are standards of behavior defined in
terms of rights and obligations; rules are specific prescriptions or proscrip-
tions for action; lastly, decision-making procedures are prevailing practices
for making and implementing collective choice.
Political scientists have emphasized the study of the interrelationships
between international institutions and domestic politics over the past twenty
years, as explained in a previous paper.25 This body of research has pro-
duced considerable social scientific progress along several related research
.lines. Two of the most notable are that international relations are two-level
bargaining games conducted simultaneously intrastate as well as interstate
26
and that ideas and beliefs animate international relations and political out-
27
comes as much as do national interests. However, an unfortunate resultfor international relations scholarship is that the study of IGOs has ad-
22 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 90-93 (1984).
23 ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 5 (1977).
24 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables, in INT'L REGIMES 1-2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). This definition was
presented as the product of consensus by the authors of the collection of essays initiated un-
der then editor Robert Keohane and delivered by successor editor Stephen Krasner in vol-
umes 35 and 36 ofInternational Organization.
25 Michael P. Ryan, International Governmental Organization Knowledge Management
for Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1347, 1356 (2000).
26 See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988); DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993); HELEN V. MILNER,
INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1997).
27 See generally IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:389 (2002)
vanced theoretically and conceptually at a much slower pace than other as-
pects of international institutions. International governmental organizations
have been marginalized apparently because they are understood to be mere
forums where the real action of state power, national interests, and ideas
plays itself out. The contributions to interstate cooperation of IGOs have
been ignored by many in the field. Nevertheless, some political scientists
do think of IGOs as independent, purposive actors in international relations.
Their studies have shown that state membership in IGOs has changed over
28 thtte29time and that the number and type of IGOs has also changed over time.
International law scholarship has devoted considerable energy to inter-
national dispute settlement. A useful categorization of the techniques of in-












All these techniques of international dispute settlement have been iden-
tified in the practice of states and other actors in world politics and the
economy in the modem era.
Political scientists had only glancing interest in the role of international
institutions in international economic dispute settlement,31 though recently a
few political scientists have collaborated with legal scholars to suggest that
the important dimensions of dispute settlement for study include independ-
ence, access, and embeddedness.32 This article incorporates these concepts
28 Harold K. Jacobson et al., National Entanglements in International Governmental Or-
ganization, 80 INT'L ORG. 141 (1986).
29 Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Govern-
mental Organizations: 1981-1992, 50 INT'L ORG. 493 (1996).
30 Richard B. Bilder, An Overview ofInternational Dispute Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L
Disp. RESOL. 1 (1986).
31 JOSEPH M. GRIECO, COOPERATION AMONG NATIONS: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND NON-
TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE (1990).
32 Robert 0. Keohane et al. eds., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transna-




into an alternative analytic framework by arguing that the three essential
characteristics of international governmental organizations with respect to
dispute settlement as well as other multilateral cooperation supporting-
activities are knowledge, legitimacy, and efficiency.
A. Knowledge
Human knowledge cannot be encompassed in a single technique, dis-
course, or discipline.33 Human understanding has over time become differ-
entiated like goods and services in the marketplace, divided into disciplines
and sub-disciplines, trans-boundary fields and sub-fields, organized and
compartmentalized, not merely for the sake of convenience, but to promote
cognition itself. Organization and compartmentalization are not static and
fixed, but dynamic and mutable. Marketplace knowledge and leaming ca-
pabilities tend to become institutionalized as sector-specific knowledge, or-
ganizing principles, and governance structures and these patterns of sectoral
competitiveness tend to establish path-dependent trajectories.34 Techno-
logical innovation similarly tends to be patterned along natural trajectories 35
because technological paradigms prescribe directions for further research
and development and incremental innovation, excluding other possible
paths.36 Knowledge is the stock of concepts, analytic frameworks, causal
explanations, and empirical findings which ground policy debates and jus-
tify policy outcomes. These ideas influence policy when the principled or
causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity
about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of stra-
tegic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they be-
come embedded in political institutions. 37
The cumulation and specialization of knowledge, as the functionalist
school of international relations explains, led to the creation of international
governmental organizations. 38 The capacity of the IGO to manage knowl-
the title of Legalization and World Politics (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keo-
hane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds.).
33 STEPHEN TOULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: THE COLLECTIVE USE AND EVOLUTION OF
CONCEPTS (1972).
34 See Herbert Kitschelt, Industrial Governance Structures, Innovation Strategies, and the
Case of Japan: Sectoral or Cross-National Comparative Analysis, 45 INT'L ORG. 453
(1991).35 See generally RICHARD R. NELSON AND SIDNEY G. WINTER, THE EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
36 See Giovanni Dosi, Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories, 11 RES.
POL'Y 147 (1982).
37 Goldstein & Keohane, supra note 27, at 3.
38 See generally ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE: FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); HAROLD K. JACOBSON, NETWORKS OF
INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE GLOBAL POLITICAL SYSTEM,
(2d ed. 1984).
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edge determines its life-cycle, which can be stagnation, decline, and possi-
bly even death or growth, learning, adaptation, and renewal. 39 Knowledge
management, the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information,
drives the service capabilities of the international governmental organiza-
tions, we might say.40 An IGO may provide a forum, administrative sup-
port, and research support for international rule creation; it may provide
advisory and administrative services or it may provide administrative and
legal support for rule-compliance surveillance and dispute settlement. For
example, I have argued that, in one area of multilateral trade lawmaking,
the IGO decisively contributed to the existence of agreement text and
thereby the successful outcome through the application of function-specific
knowledge to the treaty-making process. 41 By carrying out its activities, the
IGO likely not only disseminates knowledge but also diffuses ideas, norms,
and values. 42 Functionalists explain that IGOs are knowledge-intensive and
that expert professional staff are the source of the service capability of
IGOs. Many of these professionals are active participants in the transna-
tional epistemic communities which influence international relations.43 The
knowledge characteristic of IGOs explain what they are capable of doing.
B. Legitimacy
IGOs are neither multi-national corporations ("MNCs") nor non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"). Public organizations exist for
wholly different purposes than do for-profit business enterprises and not-
for-profit private social organizations. Business enterprises seek to make
money by selling goods and services to consumers while nonprofits seek to
deliver services on behalf of their stakeholders. In contrast, public organiza-
tions seek to create public value by delivering services to citizens. Max
Weber explained that public bureaucracy conducting activities according to
rule of public law was what separated modern state authority from tradi-
tional patrimonial and feudal structures. 44 Public administrators are ac-
countable to citizens and their elected representatives and must emphasize
accountability in the design of organizational structures and processes.
39 See generally ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THREE MODELS OF
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1990).
40 Ryan, supra note 25, at 1347-1378.
41 Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 535 (1998).42 See Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 INT'L
ORG. 565 (1993).
43 See Peter M. Haa5, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to
Protect Stratospheric Ozone, 46 INT'L ORG. 187 (1992).
44 MAX WEBER ET AL., FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 239 (1946).
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Public organizations value fairness, integrity, independence, and re-
sponsiveness 45 because their legitimacy depends on whether they behave
that way. When designing public organizations, political authorities strike a
balance between responsiveness to and independence from constituents and
themselves. Access measures the range of social and political actors who
have legal standing to submit a dispute to be resolved.4 6 Independence
measures the extent to which adjudicators for an international authority
charged with dispute resolution are able to deliberate and reach legal judg-
ments independently of national governments.47 National policymakers
consider political transaction costs48 when determining whether sub-state
actors get access to transnational dispute settlement bodies and how much
independence to grant to the body.
It is not that public management theorists and practitioners do not
know sometimes how to improve the efficiency of public organizations.
Rather, it is that they struggle to do so while preserving the commitment to
legitimacy. Moreover, it is not that public management theorists and practi-
tioners do not recognize that a private sector provider might well be able to
provide more efficient service; instead, it is that the legitimacy goal is better
served by a not-for-profit public organization. Hence IGOs that act with
fairness and integrity are independent from national politics, but are respon-
sive to state member-oversight. IGOs can sometimes carry out services
with greater legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders than can private
sector, profit-seeking enterprises. The legitimacy characteristic of IGOs
explains why they do what they do.
C. Efficiency
An organization is a mechanism of governance, an institution which
operate[s] at the level of individual transactions. 49 Organizations arise be-
cause they perform valued tasks more efficiently than markets or alternative
institutional structures. 50 The organization is able to reduce the transaction
costs of a needed good or service below the costs which it would find in the
marketplace. An IGO similarly arises because it performs services for its
stakeholders more efficiently than alternative institutional structures, e.g.,
more loosely institutionalized transnational epistemic communities. Func-
tionalist political scientists have studied how IGO internal leadership, or-
ganizational structure and process, and principal-agent relations with
45 See ROBERT C. FRIED, PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 43 (1976).
46 Keohane et al., supra note 32, at 462.
41 Id. at 459.
48 Id. at 463.
49 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISM OF GOVERNANCE 4 (1996).
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member-states determine their decision-making patterns. 5'
A sociological approach to institutions provides the appropriate
framework for analysis: characteristics of bureaucracy as a generic cultural
form shape international organization behavior and provide a different and
broader basis for thinking about how international organizations influence
world politics. 52 International governmental organizations collect, analyze,
and disseminate information then turn it into products and services more ef-
ficiently than do markets or alternative institutional structures.53 IGOs, like
business enterprises, find their ultimate sources of competitive advantage in
their knowledge management capacities. 54 The collective knowledge,
know-how, and learning of the organization are the core competencies
which drive its organizational strategy.55 Knowledge integration is embed-
ded into organizational behaviors, practices, and routines in order to create
and sustain capability.5 6 These organizational behaviors, practices, and rou-
tines are the day-to-day stuff of activities and these activities may be carried
out with higher or lower transaction costs, i.e., with higher or lower levels
of efficiency. The efficiency characteristic of the IGO explains how they do
what they do.
iii. TRADE DISPUTES AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF WTO
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
Disputes regarding rights and obligations between and among contract-
ing parties within the international trade regime occasionally occur and,
when they do, the 1947 GATT treaty specified procedures for dispute set-
tlement. GATT Article XXII offers consultation, that is, bilateral negotia-
tion, as the initial dispute settlement technique. But, the GATT agreement
specifies in Article XXIII that
if no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties con-
cerned within a reasonable time.., the matter may be referred to the contracting
parties. The contracting parties shall promptly investigate any matter so re-
ferred to them and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting
parties which they consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter as
51 See generally ROBERT W. COX ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF INFLUENCE: DECISION MAKING
IN INT'L ORG. (1974).
52 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of In-
ternational Organizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 700 (1999).
53 See Ouchi, supra note 50.
54 See Bruce Kogut & Udo Zander, Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities,
and the Replication of Technology, 9 ORG. Sci. 383 (Aug. 1992).
55 See C.K Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, 68 HARV.
Bus. REV. 79 (1990).56 See Robert M. Grant, Prospering in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organ-





GATT did not obligate disputants to take their problems to the GATT for
settlement; conflicts could be'resolved bilaterally. Nevertheless, GATT de-
veloped the practice from the contracting parties, upon request of the dispu-
tants, to assist in the resolution of bilateral disputes through the formation
of working parties. This emerged by 1948, and panels of experts appeared
in 1952"7 apparently at the recommendation of GATT Director General Eric
Wyndham White.5 8 The panel-of-experts technique quickly superseded the
working party technique. Three (or occasionally five in the early years)
panelists of impartial experts studied the written submissions and listened to
the oral arguments of the disputants with assistance of staff from the GATT
secretariat, applying GATT rules to the conflict and issuing a decision.
Many cases would be withdrawn before a panel decision was announced. A
decision concluded a year-long process which might favor the initiator or
the respondent, but frequently ended with ambiguous encouragement to-
ward a negotiated settlement.
A legal scholar who studied all of the GATT-era dispute settlement ex-
perience explains that fundamental disagreements among the Member-
states-and possibly the panelists as well-about the substance of the rules
caused the ambiguous outcomes. 9 He explains that the decline in the use
of GATT dispute settlement procedures in the 1960s was due to a loss of
confidence in legalization and a perception that the rules were outdated. A
long-time serving GATT secretariat official who assisted panelists in many
of the cases and who wrote the official public documents regarding dispute
settlement concurs that the main problem lay with international trade law
and that legalism rose substantially and procedurally after the Tokyo Round
multilateral trade negotiations settled many previously unclear areas of
GATT law.60 In other words, the knowledge at GATT was inadequate to
solve the problems at hand.
Many legal scholars and observers of GATT dispute settlement in the
1980s contended, however, that it was the procedures which were diminish-
ing the value of the mechanism and threatening the legitimacy of the whole
organization. Critics proposed reforms which would: (1) obligate members
to accept the creation of a panel upon request of another member; (2) hasten
decisions through internal deadlines; (3) use permanent, not ad hoc, panel
57 ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 75 (2d
ed. 1990).
58 See John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the World Trade Organization: Emerging
Problems, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 329, 333 (1998).
59 Hudec, supra note 57, at 152.
60 See HANDBOOK OF GATT DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT 21-22 (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds.,
1992).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:389 (2002)
tribunals; (4) conclude with automatic report adoption by the GATT Coun-
cil (the main governing body of GATT, composed of contracting party rep-
resentatives); (5) encourage third country participation; (6) streamline
disputes by screening out inappropriate disputes; and (7) improve GATT
surveillance capability with the expectation that the result would be higher
61
rates of decision implementation and compliance. Other critics contended
that unilateral enforcement by the United States under authority of its Sec-
tion 301 policy threatened the legitimacy of GATT. 62 However, my empiri-
cal study of U.S. behavior showed that GATT rules and dispute settlement
decisions were informing and influencing U.S. export policy actions even
before the completion of the Uruguay Round.63 Additionally, the legiti-
macy of IGO dispute settlement mattered to U.S. national policymakers as
they carried out integrated unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral diplomacy.
64
The Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations resulted in agree-
ment to reform dispute settlement procedures as they would be carried out
under the new World Trade Organization.65 A contracting party to the
WTO that requests establishment of a dispute settlement panel will get it
unless all the members of the Dispute Settlement Body (the WTO General
Council acting in its dispute settlement capacity) vote against it. Thus, re-
spondent states cannot block the establishment of a panel. The three-
member panel of experts must issue its report to the DSB within six months
of its establishment and may be called upon to issue its report within three
months if the case is an emergency. 6 The panel report must be adopted
unless all DSB members vote to reject it or unless the report is appealed to
the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body-seven eminent scholars and
practitioners in international economic relations serving for four-year terms
in their personal, not national, capacities-is to hear appeals of panel deci-
sions. Three members of the Appellate Body are assigned to a particular
case and must render a decision within two months of their assignment.
The DSB must monitor implementation of the panel report and the prevail-
61 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 1 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 51 (1987);
see generally Heather A. Hazard, Resolving Disputes in International Trade (1988) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the Harvard University Library);
see also Rosine Planck, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does
Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 53 (1987).
62 See generally AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICAS 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
63 See Michael P. Ryan, USTR's Implementation of 301 Policy in the Pacific, 39 INT'L
STUDIES Q. 333 (1995).
64 See generally MICHAEL P. RYAN, PLAYING BY THE RULES: AMERICAN TRADE POWER
AND DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC (1995).
65 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF




ing member is entitled to compensation if the losing member does not com-
ply with the demands of the panel report.6 7 That compensation is normally
to take the form of suspension of concessions in the same or a closely-
related market sector.
The best evidence that the dispute settlement system reforms have been
effective and have achieved enhanced efficiency may be that 114 disputes
were submitted in the first three years of its operation-a number slightly
over half the universe of report-decided cases in the entire 1947-1994
GATT era.68 Dispute settlement under the World Trade Organization has
been widely praised by scholars and commentators. The procedural re-
forms have apparently solved the problems which they were intended to
solve and the creation of the Appellate Body is contributing to more consis-
tency in dispute settlement panel decisions, thereby enhancing their credi-
bility and the legitimacy of the WTO.6 9 Reformed procedures,
notwithstanding, improvements may well owe to the more than 30,000
pages of frequently precise and unconditional international guarantees of
freedom, nondiscrimination, and rule of law in WTO law. °
This body of law is embedded in more than 50 years of institutional-
ized commitment to knowledge of the principles of the economic welfare
gains from free trade, multilateralism, the reduction of trade barriers, non-
discrimination in trade policies, reciprocity in trade relations, fair trade
practices, and economic growth and development through liberal trade poli-
cies and institutions among many of the governments of the world.7' Some
legal scholars identify lingering ambiguities and newly-emerging weak-
nesses in WTO law or knowledge as the main challenge for future WTO
dispute settlement.7 2 A few scholars caution that national sovereignty and
national security continue to challenge WTO competence to decide dis-
67 Id.
68 See Andrew W. Shoyer, The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observa-
tions and Suggestions, I J. INT'L ECON L. 277 (1998).
69 See Debra P. Steger and Susan M. Hainsworth, World Trade Organization Dispute Set-
tlement: The First Three Years, .I J. INT'L ECON. L. 199 (1998).
70 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law--Lessons
for Strenthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 189, 234 (1999).
71 See Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GA TT and the Regulation of Trade
Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions, in INT'L REGIMES, supra note 24, at 273-314;
John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberal-
ism in the Postwar Economic Order, in INT'L REGIMES, supra note 24, at 195-232; see also
Jackson, supra note 65, at 1-78.72 See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem
for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619 (1998); Jackson, supra note 58, at 343-46;
see also Symposium, First Three Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32 INT'L
LAW. 609 (1998).
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putes. 73 On the other hand, a growing number of scholars and other observ-
ers opine that decision-making at the organization is undemocratic and call
into question the legitimacy of the WTO laws which underlie dispute set-
tlement decisions.74
In summary, legal scholarship concerning the 50-year GATT/WTO
experience with international economic dispute settlement may have identi-
fied the following patterns of change with respect to law, or knowledge, and
procedures, or efficiency:
* Laws: Ambiguous GATT laws are supplemented with more
precise WTO laws.
* Appeals: No possibility is replaced by automatic opportunity
to permanent appeals body.
* Decisions: Appellate Body ensures more consistency among
decisions.
* Technique: Mediation gives way to quasi-judicial tribunal.
* Formality: Less formal consultations give way to formal panel
of experts.
* Participation: Diplomats give way to experts.
* Procedures: Ad hoc become routine.
* Time-lines: Open-ended give way to deadlines.
* Secretariat support: Occasional legal counsel support gives
way to regular support.
* Decision adoption: One-state veto is replaced by exceptional
rejection if unanimous veto.
* Enforcement: Legitimated but unauthorized action replaced
with authorized compensation.
Hence, WTO legitimacy with respect to international dispute settle-
ment is the product of two facts. First, it is the result of a cumulating
knowledge base of ideas about trade economics and institutions, of multi-
lateral trade negotiation-produced codified rules, and of Dispute Settlement
73 See Hannes L. Scholemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, "Constitutionalization " and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT'L LAW
424 (1999).
7 See Jeffrey Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice,
and International Trade, 19 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 229 (1998); Robert F. Housman,
Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994);
Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongov-
ernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liber-
alism, Values, and the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 851 (1996);
Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International
Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587 (1998).
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Body and Appellate Body-made decisions. Second, the legitimacy also re-
sults from improved, more efficient procedures.
IV. THE INTERNET, THE WWW, AND THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
The Internet owes its existence to the U.S. Department of Defense Ad-
vanced Research Planning Agency ("ARPA"). 75 The Department of De-
fense ("DOD") had begun to computerize their operations by the 1960s but
they were using a variety of incompatible information technology systems
made by a variety of suppliers. As is often the case during the early phases
of the product life cycle, the business of computers and information tech-
nology lacked standards for equipment-making, so systems frequently oper-
ated independently of each other. However, while private enterprises, such
as a General Motors or a General Electric could-in theory if not in prac-
tice-purchase all their info-tech equipment from one supplier, government
agencies, such as the DOD, purchased equipment according to government
procurement regulations which demanded that specifications be set regard-
ing performance and price, with contracts being granted competitively
based on the capacity to meet specifications. Thus, the DOD faced what
would come to be known as the interoperability problem.
In the early 1960s, computer scientists at ARPA, in a newly-formed
unit called the Information Processing Techniques Office, noted that the re-
search laboratories with which they cooperated around the United States (in
the Northeast at Harvard and MIT, in the Midwest at Carnegie Mellon, Illi-
nois, and Michigan, and in the west at Berkeley, Stanford, and UCLA) were
all seeking funds from ARPA to increase their computing capabilities and
that efforts of the funding would be felt over time. The first implication of
this funding was that all the labs would want as much equipment as they
could get, which would be expensive and duplicative. The second implica-
tion is that government procurement rules would cause incompatibility to
become worse. Hence, they came up with the idea of a network which
would inter-connect the computer capabilities around the United States, al-
lowing individual labs to specialize yet share info tech resources. They
contended that interoperability could be achieved through the creation of a
network which would integrate differing computer systems,76 so ARPA
funded basic design work of what would come to be known as
AARPANET.
ARPA hired a Boston-based info-tech company to lead the develop-
ment of the network in cooperation with their labs and computer scientists.
One of the developers proposed a particular solution to a technical problem
75 KATIE HAFNER & MATrHEW LYON, WHEN WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF
THE INTERNET 34-38 (1996).
76 Id. at 40-49.
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by sending a Request for Comment ("RFC") to the participating computer
scientists on April 7, 1969. The basic ground rules were that anyone could
say anything and that nothing was official. RFCs quickly became the mo-
dus operandi for the ARPANET crowd.77 The language of the RFC was
warm and welcoming and the idea was to promote cooperation, not ego.
Since then, RFCs have been the principal means of open expression in the
computer networking community, the accepted way of recommending, re-
viewing, and adopting new technical standards.78
Their Internet worked and, during the 1970s, an increasing number of
universities and research organizations joined the network. In 1983, the
Defense Department split off its system from the others, which had grown
so large that one of the designers of the system was enlisted by the others to
assign a number to each node on the network and to maintain the list.
79
Members of the user-community recognized a system needed to be de-
signed and established but, for years, sorting this out was among the most
troublesome, messiest issues for the Internet. 80 Several members of the
Internet community in late 1983 volunteered to design such a system and,
after three months work, they issued two RFCs in 1983 outlining their pro-
posed Domain Name System ("DNS"). The Internet community argued
back and forth over what to name the domains, delaying any implementa-
tion for about a year.8' At a January 1986 summit meeting, leaders in the
community agreed by consensus on the DNS and settled on seven Top-
Level Domain Names ("TLDN"): .edu, .com, .mil., .net, .org, .int, and
.gov.82 The Domain Name System was supervised by one of the original
architects, who was based at the University of Southern California Informa-
tion Sciences Institute, and his operation would come to be known as the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA") by 1988. He personally
assigned and recorded domain names until the task became too great. At
that point, ARPA signed a contract with the Stanford Research Institute to
take over domain name registration under the supervision of IANA, which
had the trust of the Internet community. That registration system remained
in place until 1992 when ARPA turned over supervision of the non-military
Internet to the National Science Foundation.
The National Science Foundation ("NSF") supervised the further de-
velopment of the Internet by providing institutional support to the Internet
community, still largely based at universities and research organizations,
77 GILLIES AND CAILLIAU, supra note 7, at 29 (quoting Steve Crocker).
78 HAFNER AND LYON, supra note 75, at 144-45.
79 Id. at 249-53.80 Id. at 252.
81 id.




through grants to Internet technology developers to establish a communica-
tion backbone system called NSFNET. The number of registrants of do-
main names, however, was increasing more rapidly with each passing year,
so NSF announced that it would welcome bids from potential successors to
JANA and SRI to manage the domain name registration system. In 1992, it
awarded the contract to Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a small informa-
tion technology services provider based in Herndon, Virginia. Business en-
terprises, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and academic
institutions would thus henceforth register with Network Solutions their
domain names of .com, .gov, .edu, .org, or .net.
At about the same time, Internet developers in Europe and the United
States were perfecting the graphical and browser technologies which would
enable the World Wide Web. The Internet would no longer be for e-mailing
and file transfer of data sets only.83 The Web enabled an electronic market-
place and, consequently, .com domain name registrations took off. Net-
works Solutions registered 177 domain names in December 1995, 627 in
December 1996, 1,541 in December 1997, 3,362 in December 1998, and
8,100 in December 1999 (most of them .com TLDNs).84 With their new
utility as marketing tools, the market for domain names has been expand-
ing. Websites could be designed which skillfully blended graphics and text
to push information at consumers. Thus, NSI has been receiving domain
name registrations for one-time events such as www.superbowlxxxv.com,
for summer blockbuster movies such as www.matrix.com, and for personal
use such as www.smithfamily.com. In September 1995 the National Sci-
ence Foundation re-wrote the NSI contract so that it could charges fees to
registrants in order to manage the flood of applications. They decided on a
thirty-five dollar fee to register the domain name and a fifteen-dollar fee to
renew the registration.
V. INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES, CYBERSQUATTING, AND TRADEMARKS
Domain names carry value in the electronic marketplace. One venture
paid a domain name owner $7.5 million to acquire the rights to a name.85
In that example, the purchaser did not claim to have established any trade-
mark rights associated with the name which had been registered and, hence,
simply wanted to acquire rights to the domain name use. In an increasing
number of instances, however, trademark owners have complained that
other entities have registered domain names which are identical to or con-
fusingly similar to their trademarked names and that this is at minimum
83 See GILLIES AND CAILLIAU, supra note 7.
84 Telephone interview with Donald Telage, NSI (Nov. 9, 2001).
85 Andrew Pollack, What's in a Cybername? $7.5 Million for the Right Address, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at C8.
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creating confusion in the emerging electronic marketplace. Moreover, they
contend that this is most likely an illegitimate taking of trademark rights
earned by them through usage in the real marketplace. For example, one
man registered dozens of domain names under names such as goldman-
sachsdirect.com and jpmorganonline.com.
For the first couple of years of its management of the registration proc-
ess, NSI responded to applications in a strictly first come, first served man-
ner. Thus, an application would not be rejected. The NSI practice,
however, riled the owners of the real-marketplace trademarks. Trademark
owners contended that these registrations were bogus attempts to profit by
registering the names cheaply by paying the modest registration fee and re-
selling them to the trademark owners dearly; they cried foul.8 6 Attorneys
representing trademark owners such as Coca-Cola, Porsche, and Warner
Brothers called it cybersquatting; quick-to-file registrants, on the other
hand, called it entrepreneurship.
By identifying a business enterprise, governmental or nongovernmen-
tal organization, or academic institution, an Internet domain name serves a
role in electronic commerce akin to a trademark in real commerce. A
trademark is a word or words, a number or character, a picture or symbol or
graphic design, or sound or some combination of them which an enterprise
uses to identify its goods or services and distinguish them from those of
others.87 Trademarks convey information to consumers and provide incen-
tives to producers to establish good will in the marketplace. A trademark
strategy is essential to brand management. Trademark law, policy, and
public administration is essential to proper functioning of a market econ-
omy.
The trademark originated in Roman times when artisans placed upon
their works an identifying mark. Medieval guilds in Europe adopted the
trademark practice in order to police their membership and prevent compe-
tition in local commerce by nonmembers. In fact, the trademark was first
codified into law in Renaissance Venice. Trademarks are today codified
into the laws of many countries around the world and several international
treaties provide sources of international law regarding trademarks, includ-
ing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Ma-
drid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, and the
Trademark Law Treaty. These treaties are administered by WIPO.
86 Patrick McGeehan & Matt Richtel, What's in a Web Address? Maybe a Lawsuit, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al.
87 For detailed discussion of trademark and unfair competition law and policy, see JANE
C. GINSBURG ET AL, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed.




The law and policy behind trademarks spring from the law and policy
of unfair competition. Government protects the trademarks of enterprises in
order to prevent competitors from confusing or deceiving consumers in the
marketplace by passing-off their goods and services as those produced by or
associated with the trademark owners. Thus, in the United States trademark
rights grow out of use, not mere adoption, of the mark and "usage" means
placing goods and promoting the sale of these goods in the marketplace. A
trademark becomes a registered trademark through a process administered
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). The trademark
owner pays an application fee and files an application which identifies the
mark, specifies the manner and dates of its first use, and provides drawings
and specimens. A USPTO examiner examines the mark for distinctiveness
and searches for conflicting marks. The applicant's mark is then published
in the Official Gazette, where competitors have a time-limited opportunity
to oppose the registration. If no opposition occurs, the trademark is regis-
tered and gains national rights under federal law. In the United States,
trademarks may also be established under authority of the common law of
the states.
A trademark owner must use the mark in good faith within six months
to one year after registration in order to minimize the risk of loss of rights.
A trademark owner must continue to take action to maintain trademark
rights, including using the mark on a commercial scale, carrying out proper
licensing practices, enforcing rights against infringement, and renewing
registration every ten years. Not as a matter of law, but as a matter of busi-
ness strategy, trademark owners are encouraged to strengthen their marks in
accordance with a marketing strategy so as to deter conflicts with competi-
tors and succeed when conflicts occur. A trademark is measured by its dis-
tinctiveness, and a distinctive trademark is capable of identifying the source
of goods. There are four different categories related to trademarks: (1) ge-
neric, which earns no trademark rights; (2) descriptive, which can earn
trademark rights if sufficiently distinctive; (3) suggestive, which tends to be
distinctive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful, which are presumed to be by nature
inherently distinctive.
A distinctive trademark carries secondary meaning, i.e., is established
in the minds of consumers through long and exclusive use in commerce an
association with a particular producer. Numbers, colors, sounds, smells,
and other symbols can acquire secondary meaning. Proper and geographic
names can, through the acquisition of secondary meaning, overcome the re-
luctance in trademark law to grant exclusive use of a proper or geographic
name to one entity. Trademarks deemed to be famous earn rights which
exceed those associated with trademarks deemed to be merely distinctive.
Trademark rights endure indefinitely unless lost, either because the owner
has abandoned the mark or because the trademark has become generic in
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the minds of the public. A trademark owner abandons rights by discontinu-
ing use of the mark, inadequately enforcing rights against unauthorized us-
ers, or insufficiently controlling licensees. A trademark which becomes
generic in the minds of the public, whether or not through fault of the
owner's actions, is lost.
Trademark owners who conduct their commercial activities in good
faith sometimes find themselves in disputes with other trademark owners
who have similarly been conducting their commercial activities in good
faith. Entry by an enterprise into a different industry sector or geographic
market can place one trademark in conflict with another. Since trademarks
do not confer exclusive rights (as do patents over innovations and copy-
rights over expressions), U.S. courts and tribunals seek equitable or fair set-
tlements of these disputes. Infringement of a trademark occurs when a
competitor distributes the same or a confusingly similar product or service
in the same or closely-related market sector and, or, same geographic area.
Confusion in the minds of consumers is always the main question and de-
pends upon (1) the strength of the mark, (2) degree of similarity between
the marks, (3) proximity of the goods/services, (4) distribution strategies of
the disputants, (5) evidence of confusion, (6) good faith, (7) quality of
goods/services, and (8) sophistication of the buyers. 88
The law, policy, and public administration of trademark and unfair
competition, which has evolved through hundreds of years of practice, con-
tributes concepts, principles, rules and associated institutions to the devel-
opment of a law, policy, and public administration of Internet domain
names, especially with respect to dispute settlement.8 9 This is true, at least
in theory, for trademark law was not initially embraced by the computer-
science and engineering culture of the inventors of the Internet. 90
VI. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, INTERNET GOVERNANCE, AND
LEGITIMACY
The flood of domain name registrations led people at NSF and IANA
to consider reform of the DNS. The need for unique domain names and the
exploding commercial interest in registration suggested that the .com top-
level domain name would be inadequate to future electronic commerce.
The disputes between domain name owners and trademark owners were
common and the latter were complaining about it an increasing number of
88 Id.
89 Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, I RICH. J.L & TECH. 1 (1995), available at http://urich.edu/-jolt/vIiI/
burk.html (n.d.).
90 Telephone interview with David Maher, Vice President for Public Policy, Internet So-




public forums. Some users of the DNS registration process questioned why
a single, private sector firm (NSI) was allowed to continue as a monopoly
provider of registration services. In addition, a new complaint was increas-
ingly being heard in the Internet community: use of the Internet was grow-
ing around the world, yet registration was carried out by an American
government selected provider. The traditional ways of Internet governance
were being called illegitimate by trademark owners, foreign domain name
registrants, and even many people within the original community of Internet
architects and early adopters.
In September 1996, the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) was
established to re-consider the DNS.91 The IAHC was composed of 11 rep-
resentatives, including one from NSF, five from the Internet community, a
Japanese academic, one representative from International Telecommunica-
tions Union, and two lawyers from the International Trademark Association
and another lawyer from WIPO. As one participant recalled with some
amusement, this group consisted of three lawyers and eight engineers: us
versus them. 92 The IAHC established a process with a series of meetings
and opportunities for international public comment and set as its goal a re-
formed DNS by the summer of 1997.
In February 1997, after receiving some 4,000 comments from inter-
ested parties, the IAHC circulated a draft plan for public comment. 93 The
report recommended that the following goals guide a reformed DNS:
* Entitle every owner of a valid trademark registration to a
unique domain name that contains the trademark without al-
teration;
* Allow registration of domain names corresponding to identical
trademarks by different owners of the trademark (e.g., in dif-
ferent goods and services sectors);
* Establish the most efficient registration procedures possible;
* Stop rampant piracy without resorting to extensive litigation;
* Avoid the need for policing of all TLDNs;
* Avoid legal liability regarding trademark-domain disputes for
registries;
* Take into consideration the needs of noncommercial domain
name owners.
91 These sections are based on documents obtained at interviews with staff of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (1997).92 Telephone interview with David Maher, supra note 87.
93 Internet Society, Seven New Top Level Domain Names are Added For Internet Ad-
dresses and Up to 28 New Registrars Planned, THE ISOC FORUM vol. 3, no. 2 (Feb. 20,
1997), at http://www.isoc.org/infosvc/forum/970220forum.txt (n.d.).
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The IAHC recommended the creation of new generic top-level domain
names, including:
" firm for businesses or firms;
* store for businesses offering goods to purchase;
" .web for entities emphasizing activities relating to the World
Wide Web;
* .arts for entities emphasizing cultural and entertainment ac-
tivities;
* .rec for entities emphasizing recreation and entertainment;
* .info for entities providing information services;
" .nom for individuals desiring personal nomenclature
The report recommended that an idea that had been talked about in the past
be made policy, that national top-level domain names be established to cor-
respond with the International Standard Organization 3166 country code.
For example, Switzerland would use .ch nomenclature, Japan would use .jp,
and the United States would use. us.
The IAHC proposed that in place of the single registration firm in Vir-
ginia, 28 firms be established, four competing in each of seven world re-
gions. It also recommended that an independent, nonprofit Council of
Registrars ("CORE") be established in Geneva under the nonprofit organi-
zation laws of Switzerland to oversee the registration system. The proposal
establishes criteria for selecting registration firms. They must be located in
countries that are either members of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (the main trademark treaty administered by the World
Intellectual Property Organization) or the World Trade Organization, pre-
sent a business or marketing plan, comply with standard accounting prac-
tices, and have liability insurance, adequate capitalization, experienced
staff, customer service measures, reliable online access capabilities, robust
backup procedures, disaster recovery plans, and management expertise.
Selected registrars would sign a Memorandum of Understanding re-
garding operation of registration sites with, pay fees to, and be subject to
the oversight of CORE. The entire system would be subject to the over-
sight of the Policy Oversight Committee, a group with representation in
staggered terms from the International Telecommunications Union, Interna-
tional Organization for Standards, World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion, and several nongovernmental Internet and trademark organizations.
Disputes regarding domain names would be settled through mediation of-
fered by the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual
Property Organization. The IAHC recommended adoption of its proposals




NSF contract with Network Solutions was set to expire.
The proposals were not adopted in 1997, however. Critics, especially
Network Solutions, questioned the legitimacy of the IAHC; critics wanted
to know the origin of authority granted to this nongovernmental organiza-
tion to propose such far-reaching changes to the DNS, a vital institutional
facilitator of the Internet, the World Wide Web, and the future of electronic
commerce. The National Science Foundation had been represented in the
IAHC, but the commercialization of the Internet and the proliferation of
commercial disputes plunged the National Science Foundation into the deep
waters of public controversy about Internet governance and its leaders
sought to pull themselves out and return to the safe ground of encouraging
science and technology. The Clinton administration moved executive au-
thority over Internet governance and policy from NSF to the Department of
Commerce and the proposals of the IAHC were shelved.
The U.S. government established the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN") in late 1998 with the mission of taking
over the National Science Foundation roles with respect to technical stan-
dard-setting, the Internet Protocol System, the Domain Name System, and
the Domain Name System root server system. No one has questioned the
knowledge-base of the people who have been recruited to serve ICANN.
However, ICANN, its source of authority, its mission, its leadership, its
membership, its decision-making, its sources of funding-in short, every-
thing about its legitimacy-has been controversial and remains unsettled.
94
Domain name registration institution-building is on-going, with private,
governmental, and nongovernmental stakeholders seeking to design struc-
tures and procedures which possess knowledge and efficiency and, perhaps
most challenging of all, legitimacy.
ICANN has, however, created competition for registration of domain
names: some 80 companies provide registration services. As the competi-
tors started arriving on the scene, NSI's share of the .com domain name reg-
istration has declined from a near-monopoly 92% at the end of 1999 to a
still-dominant 53% in May 2001.9 VeriSign, Inc., the Mountain View,
California company that acquired NSI in March 2000 for over $17 billion
94 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Losers, Lawmakers Worked Up over Internet Suffixes;
Panel's Approval Process Questioned. Why .coop but not .nom?, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2001,
at E3; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Masters of Internet Domains Go to War, Network Solutions,
]CANN in Turf War That Could Destabilize the Net, WASH. POST, July 22, 1999, at El; Jeri
Clausing, A Leader in Cyberspace, It Seems, Is No Politician, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at
Cl; Jeri Clausing, What's in a Name: Arcane Internal Bickering, Internet Agency Grimly
Learns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2000, at C9; John Schwartz, NSI Keeps Keys to Internet Do-
main, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1999, at El.
95 Susan Stellin, New Economy: New Contract Covering Internet Domain Name Registry
Raises Questions About Whether the Address System Is Competitive, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2001, at C4.
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(the biggest Internet acquisition until AOL acquired Time Warner) negoti-
ated with ICANN that it will continue to control and manage the master
.com registration list until 2007.96
Nonetheless, some early domain name disputes involving (alleged) cy-
bersquatting were settled by purchase by the real marketplace trademark
owner of the rights to the electronic marketplace domain name. However,
trademark owners neither liked the solution as a matter of principle nor the
prices which some registrants were seeking to extract. As a result, they
filed suit in U.S. federal district courts, claiming that their trademark rights
were being infringed. The relationship between the law of trademark and
the law of Internet domain names, however, was being tested. Furthermore,
because many federal district and circuit courts might issue rival decisions
that could take years to be settled by the Supreme Court, some people be-
lieved that Congress ought to intervene quickly and decisively to remove
uncertainties. In response, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act in 1999, a law which permits trademark owners to
take action in federal court when they believe a confusingly-similar domain
name has been registered by another entity.
VII. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND WIPO ARBITRATION
Litigation, however, consumes cash and many months of time even in
the best of circumstances-too long in the judgment of electronic com-
merce business strategists and policymakers. Too much executive time is
misspent and too much uncertainty over outcomes impedes marketing plan
implementation and cools the ardor of investors. Thus, trademark owners
and electronic commerce policymakers called for alternatives to court liti-
gation, especially when bad faith registration takes place. With the encour-
agement of ICANN, the WIPO announced that it would sponsor a series of
eleven forums to be held around the world in 1998 and 1999 for the purpose
of enhancing dialogue among stakeholders and articulating concepts, prin-
ciples, institutional designs, and rules of law with respect to alternative dis-
pute settlement mechanisms.
97
WIPO is the IGO most central to the international intellectual property
regime.98 It is among the most venerable of IGOs, dating its origins to the
secretariats established to administer the Paris Convention for the Protec-
96 Susan Stellirl, Verisign Wins Internet Address Contract, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2001, at
C3.97 See World Intellectual Property Organization, The Management of Internet Names and
Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues: Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name
Process, (April 30, 1999), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/finalre-
port.html, [hereinafter Final Report].
98 The following sections are drawn from MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY:




tion of Industrial Property (patents and trademarks) in 1883 and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in 1886,
which were united by the Swiss Federation into a single secretariat in
1893.99 Beginning with drafting work in 1962, a diplomatic conference
took place in 1967 which resulted in 51 mostly industrial country govern-
ments promulgating the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization. WIPO joined the United Nations system in 1974
and its mission statement has been durable in the intervening years: help
Member States create multilateral norms, help developing countries write
and administer national laws, and serve the Member States through admini-
stration of the treaties.' 00
The organization's activities are many. For some years the staff have
provided several hundred one-on-one consulting missions annually, giving
advice on subjects such as the use of information technology to improve
patent and trademark office operations. Perhaps no other IGO has executed
such an ambitious, sustained program of teaching seminars and expert con-
ferences than has WIPO. The organization estimated by 1992 that 23,000
people, most from developing countries, have participated in their training
programs.10 1 The training programs and expert conferences always involve
outside academic experts and practicing attorneys in addition to WIPO pro-
fessional staff. For example, WIPO organized a symposium at Stanford in
1991 that brought together leading technologists and legal specialists.'0 2 To
move along the preparatory work for a 1996 diplomatic conference to
amend the Bere Convention on copyrights for digital technologies and the
Internet, the organization sponsored major conferences with international
experts in 1991 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1994 in Paris, and in 1995
in Mexico City and Naples. Most of the professional staff, who are lawyer-
specialists in patent, trademark, copyright, or some other area of intellectual
property law and policy, regularly attend conferences in their areas of ex-
pertise and communicate with their counterparts in other organizations.
WIPO founded an Arbitration Center in 1994 under the leadership of
its general counsel for the purpose of providing intellectual property owners
with an alternative to court litigation.'0 3 The center was established to serve
as an administering body and resource center regarding intellectual property
99 ARPAD BOGSCH, BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST 25 YEARS OF THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION 7-21 (1992).
100 RYAN, supra note 98.
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dispute settlement. The center maintains a list of qualified, approved me-
diators and arbitrators and assists disputants in the selection of a person to
handle their dispute. The center assists intellectual property owners with
the drafting of contract clauses regarding dispute settlement. It also pro-
duces and distributes educational materials and from time-to-time it organ-
izes conferences regarding intellectual property dispute settlement.
The Internet domain name public forum series sponsored by WIPO has
been praised as a model for multilateral governance.10 4 WIPO public fo-
rums were held over the course of three months in San Francisco, Brussels,
Washington, DC, 10 5 Mexico City, Cape Town, Asuncion, Tokyo, Hydera-
bad, Budapest, Cairo, and Sydney. The forums were advertised within the
Internet, trademark (legal and business), government policy communities as
well as generally to the public. Formal presentations were made by all who
requested the opportunity and extensive question-and-answer opportunities
were presented. After the conclusion of the public forum series, WIPO also
carried out its own internal study, which included extensive surveying of
domain name users. WIPO released a final report which summarized the
public views presented at the forums, contained its findings and analysis,
and recommended a role for itself in offering an alternative dispute settle-
ment mechanism.' 0 6 Participants in the WIPO Internet domain name forum
series, said the WIPO report, came to consensus that an Internet domain
name possesses a trademark function and thus that the system of domain
name registration and dispute settlement ought to draw institutional con-
struction from the law and policy of trademark. Participants in the WIPO
Internet domain name process also came to consensus that distinction ought
to be made between conflicts over domain names owing to bad faith regis-
tration versus those owing to good faith registration. A cybersquatter acts
in bad faith because the registrant can provide no evidence of having le-
gitimate interest in the domain name. Legitimate conflicts do arise, how-
ever, such as in the example of two entities which both want the rights in
electronic commerce, to delta.com, for instance.
Participants recommended that improved, efficient, legitimate dispute
settlement procedures be institutionalized to deal with bad faith cybersquat-
ting. They recommended that a non-judicial, alternative dispute settlement
procedures be established for cases of bad faith domain name registration of
distinctive trademarks. Participants expressed the hope that, in about one
month's time, an order could be issued to the domain name registry to can-
cel and reassign domain name registrations. Also, they recommended that
104 See Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An Evolving
Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 63 (2000).
105 The author hosted the Washington public forum at Georgetown University.




administrative procedures be established for famous marks which would al-
low a registry to deny a domain name registration at the time of application
or cancel it retroactively.
WIPO requested authorization from ICANN to establish such a new
dispute settlement mechanism. 0 7 The WIPO mechanism would concern
only bad-faith domain name registrations. The arbitration aimed to be
quick, by limiting discovery, and decisive, by issuing an order to an Internet
domain name registrar to take action. Disputes in which the defendant
could show a legitimate trademark interest in the domain name would be re-
jected from the WIPO system and disputants would be expected to take
their case before a court. ICANN approved in 1999 the establishment at
WIPO of its arbitration mechanism. In January 2000, a trademark owner
won back use of a domain name through the expedited, arbitral procedure
and another trademark owner successfully revoked domain name registra-
tions.108 WIPO dispute settlement mechanism regarding Internet domain
names was used more than one-thousand times in its first year of operation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
How can we account for the popularity of this new WIPO Internet-
domain-name dispute settlement mechanism? How does what we have
learned from the GATT/WTO dispute settlement experience inform WIPO
dispute settlement? The GATT/WTO experience shows that an IGO's
knowledge is critical to its dispute settlement capacity. WIPO's knowledge
about trademark law allowed the organization to step forward, first to join
the ill-fated International Ad Hoc Committee on the domain name system,
then to offer to host a series of public forums regarding domain name dis-
pute settlement. WIPO's legitimacy was earned through fair, independent
decisions and by virtue of its U.N. status and, in this regard, WIPO's le-
gitimacy exceeds that of the WTO. WIPO sponsored a series of public fo-
rums around the world to reach-out for comments from stakeholders and
issued a public report and by doing so legitimized its own role in Internet
governance. The WTO, on the other hand, is frequently criticized for being
closed to the public and nontransparent in its decision-making. The WIPO
decision to provide arbitration services only for cases of bad-faith cyber-
squatting was shrewd, for disputes in which both contenders have legitimate
107 See Francis Gurry, The Dispute Resolution Services of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 385 (1999). Francis Gurry is the WIPO general counsel
and director of its Arbitration Center.108 Jeri Clausing, New Domain Name Addresses Are Revoked by Internet Name Panel,
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Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 22:389 (2002)
trademark claims to a particular domain name cannot be settled without ex-
tensive discovery and judicial procedure which the WIPO Arbitration Cen-
ter is not equipped to provide. The relative efficiency of its dispute
settlement mechanism, when applied to bad-faith cybersquatting, by con-
trast with discovery-expensive national court-based litigation further ac-
counts for its rapid adoption as the place of choice for trademark owners.
Domain names facilitate Internet-based, digital electronic commerce
by allowing users to locate the electronic source of information, goods, or
services and, for this reason, domain names have come increasingly to pos-
sess commercial value. As the value of domain names has risen, so have
the disputes between and among those who would like to register and use
particular names. The unique address role of an Internet domain name,
such as the fact that there can be only one, e.g., delta.com, intensifies the
commercial stakes regarding the identification role of the Internet domain
name. Disputes arise among enterprises and organizations which want the
same domain name, challenging national courts to settle conflicts and fo-
menting demands for alternative dispute settlement procedures. A variety
of stakeholders have participated in a process, with institutional support
provided by the WITO, to establish alternative dispute settlement proce-
dures and there is an emerging global consensus that Internet domain name
policy and administration ought build upon concepts developed in the intel-
lectual property law and policy field of trademarks and unfair competition,
for Internet domain names are the trademarks of electronic commerce.
Stakeholders--business, governmental and nongovernmental organizations,
and the public--are challenged to institutionalize knowledgeable, legitimate
as well as efficient market-facilitating institutions and to do so despite the
fact that technology and commercial strategies of the electronic marketplace
will continue to evolve for some years to come. Consequently, their institu-
tions must be built with the capacity to evolve as well.
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